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OVER FORTY YEARS IN THE ON-DECK
CIRCLE: CONGRESS AND THE BASEBALL
ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
EDMUND P. EDMONDS*
In the history of the legal regulation of professional teams sports,
probably the widest known and least precisely understood is the trilogy
of United States Supreme Court cases' establishing Major League
Baseball's exemption from federal antitrust laws 2 and the actions of
the United States Congress regarding the exemption. In the wake of
the ouster of Fay Vincent as the Commissioner of Baseball' and against
* Director of the Law Library and Professor of Law, Loyola University School of
Law, New Orleans. B.A., 1973, University of Notre Dame, M.L.S., 1974, University of
Maryland, J.D., 1978, University of Toledo. I wish to thank William P. Barnette for his
diligent and capable work as a research assistant.
1. Federal Baseball v. National League, 259 U.S. 200 (1922), Toolson v. New York
Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953), and Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
2. The Federal Baseball case was brought under section 7 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209, 210 (1890), and section 4 of the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4,
38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988), alleging violations of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1 2, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (current version at
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988). Toolson involved alleged violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act. The Flood case initially involved five causes of action;
the first four causes of action involved baseball's reserve system. The first cause of action
involved sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act. The second
cause of action claimed violations of state antitrust laws and state civil rights statutes. The
third cause of action involved alleged violations of state common law. The fourth cause of
action asserted that the reserve system violated anti-peonage statutes, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1988)
and 18 U.S.C. § 1581 (1988), the thirteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, and the
"freedom of labor" provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1988).
The fifth cause of action, not related to the reserve system, involved the ownership of the St.
Louis Cardinals by the Anheuser-Busch, Inc. and the ownership of the New York Yankees by
Columbia Broadcasting System. Summary judgment was granted to the Cardinals and Yankees
on the fifth cause of action in Flood v. Kuhn, 312 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See, Flood
v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aff'd, 443 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd 407
U.S. 258 (1972).
3. Fay Vincent, Baseball's eighth commissioner, resigned on September 7, 1992, after
an 18-9-1 vote by Major League Baseball's 28 owners on September 3, 1992 calling for his
resignation. Chicago White Sox chairman Jerry Reinsdorf, a key participant in the movement
to force Vincent out of office, noted his desire for a new structure for baseball's commissioner:
"He should be a CEO of the owners-not the players or the umpires of the fans. He would
handle issues involving integrity or discipline. In issues involving business he would answer to
the board of directors-the owners." Richard Demak, Baseball Strikes Out: Commissioner
Fay Vincent Resigns, SPoRTs ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 14, 1992, at 13. See also Hal Bodley, The
Last of His Kind. Restructure of Office Inevitable, USA TODAY, Sept. 8, 1992; Jerome
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the backdrop of another failed bid by St. Petersburg, Florida,4 to attract
Holtzman, Baseball Revolt: Owners Call on Vincent to Quit, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 4, 1992.
Representative Jack Brooks (D-TX), chairman of the Subcommittee on Economic and
Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee, pointed to the ouster of Vincent as a
crucial factor in convening subcommittee hearings on March 31, 1993, concerning baseball's
antitrust exemption:
We were drawn to this point by the failure of the owners to respect the
independence of their chosen commissioner who was charged with making decisions
in the best interest of the game, but who was then forced to pay the ultimate
price for keeping to that standard.
Hearings on Baseball's Antitrust Exemption before the Subcommittee on Economic and
Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993)
[hereinafter 1993 Hearings] (statement of Rep. Brooks).
Senator Howard Metzenbaum, D-OH, sponsor of the "Professional Baseball Antitrust
Reform Act of 1993," S. 500, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) reacted strongly to Baseball's
inability to name a new commissioner in January 1994. In an article in Baseball America,
Metzenbaum argued
During their quarterly meetings in January, the barons of baseball proved once
again that they can't be trusted to act in the best interests of the game or its
fans. Despite assurances to Congress that a new commissioner would be named
by the first of the year, major league owners refused to appoint anyone to the
post. By thumbing their collective noses at Congress and the fans, the owners
have undercut any possible claim to the extraordinary privilege that they alone
enjoy: blanket immunity from our nation's fair competition antitrust laws.
After attacking the owners for initiating fundamental changes in the commissioner's
position including responsibility as chief labor negotiator for ownership, Metzenbaum assailed
ownership's reliance on the antitrust exemption for restricting the number of televised regular
season and playoff games, the artificial scarcity of franchises, and for exacting tax subsidies
and concessions from cities with major league franchises. The senator concluded by stating
"Baseball must be made subject to the pro-competitive and pro-consumer test of our antitrust
laws. As we saw clearly this January, the sport and its fans will suffer until we impose real
accountability on the owners. The game is our national pastime, and the time has come to
take it back." Howard Metzenbaum, Perspective, BASEBALL AM., Feb. 21-Mar. 6, 1994, at 8.
4. Ownership groups hoping to attract either an existing team to St. Petersburg, Florida,
or to receive an expansion franchise have been rebuffed on numerous occasions by Major
League Baseball. The most recent involved the failed attempt to purchase the San Francisco
Giants and move the team to St. Petersburg. On August 7, 1992, Giants owner Bob Lurie
announced he had reached an agreement with a Tampa, Florida, group to sell the team for
$113 million. The group stated that the team would play its home games in the Suncoast
Dome in St. Petersburg. Lurie's decision came just two months after the citizens of San Jose,
California, defeated a referendum to fund the construction of a new stadium for the Giants
in the Bay area. The vote was the fourth negative decision by Bay area voters concerning a
proposal to finance a new stadium. William Carlsen & Marc Sandalow, Giants OK Deal to
Leave; League to Vote on Sale to Florida Group; Team Could Move After the Season, S.F.
CHRON., Aug. 8, 1992, at Al.
During August 1992, George Shinn, owner of the National Basketball Association's
Charlotte Hornets, joined with a local San Francisco investment group to present a bid for
the Giants. Shinn's plan of reducing the Giants payroll prompted the local ownership group
to convince Peter Magowan to replace Shinn as the head of the group. William Carlsen, How
Giants Were Saved; Charlotte Businessman George Shinn Kept Locals From Giving Up, S.F.
CHRON., Nov. 12, 1992, at Al. This restructured group presented National League President
Bill White with a $95 million offer on October 12. Id. Sixteen days later the group raised
their bid to $100 million. On November 10, the National League owners, by a secret vote of
nine to four, rejected the Tampa offer. Marc Sandalow & April Lynch, Giants to Stay; League
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a franchise, the 103d Congress is again considering legislation5 to alter
the long-standing status of baseball under the antitrust laws.
This article will explore the creation of the exemption and prior
legislative activities surrounding baseball's unusual position in American
antitrust law. The current legislation before Congress will be analyzed
together with testimony and commentary on these legislative initiatives.
The conclusion will present an argument for legislation drafted to
resolve specific antitrust problems rather than the passage of sweeping
legislation to remove completely the antitrust exemption.
THE BIRTH OF THE EXEMPTION
The early history of professional baseball 6 was replete with
franchise instability, harsh labor conditions for players, and the birth
and death of numerous leagues. In 1903 baseball established a measure
Turns Down Tampa Bay; Lurie Considering Local Offer; 9-to-4 Vote Against Moving Team,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 11, 1992, at Al.
Three suits were filed in San Francisco Superior Court. First, the city of San Francisco
sued the Giants, Lurie, and the Tampa group for violating the lease for Candlestick Park.
The Tampa group filed a counter-claim based on the city and local investors interference with
Lurie's contract to sell to them the Giants. Second, a local neighborhood coalition filed to
invalidate San Francisco's agreement to indemnify the local investors. Third, local investors
requested a declaratory judgment that they had not interfered with the contract of sale to the
Tampa group. Reynolds Holding, S.F. Investors Face New Suit By Tampa Bay; Complaints
Now Total 7 in Flood of Legal Action, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 1992, at Al.
The local investment group also sought a declaratory judgment in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California claiming that they had not interfered with the
Tampa transaction nor had they violated antitrust law by bidding for the Giants. Id.
Two suits were filed in Pinellas County Circuit Court in St. Petersburg. First, the Tampa
investment group requested an order allowing them to sue Major League Baseball despite a
signed covenant not to sue. The Tampa group alleged that the agreement was based upon
fraud by Bud Selig, Bill White, and the National League owners. Second, the Tampa group
also filed suit against the city of San Francisco, the San Francisco investment group, George
Shinn, and San Francisco Mayor Frank Jordan for alleged interference with the contract to
sell the Gians. Id.
Vincent Piazza and Vincent Tirendi, two members of the Tampa investment group sued
Major League Baseball alleging violations of federal constitutional and antitrust law and certain
state laws. Reynolds Holding, Lurie Sued by S.F. Over Giants' Lease; City Wants Him and
the Florida Contingent to Pay Costs of Fight to Keep the Team, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 17, 1992,
at A17. For a complete discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 176-200.
Senator Bob Graham (D-FL), a cosponsor of Senator Metzenbaum's "Professional Baseball
Antitrust Reform Act of 1993," noted in his March 1993 remarks before the Subcommittee
on Economic and Commercial Law of the House Committee on the Judiciary his displeasure
with Major League Baseball over the treatment of the Tampa Bay area. 1993 Hearings, supra
note 3 at 6-11.
5. H.R. 108, H.R. 1549, S. 500, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
6. See CHARLES ALEXANDER, OUR GAME: AN AMERICAN BASEBALL HISTORY (1991);
HAROLD SEYMOUR, BASEBALL: THE EARLY YEARS (1960); DAVID Q. VOIGHT, AMERICAN BASEBALL
(1970-1983).
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of stability with the acceptance by the National League of the American
League as an equal partner at the pinnacle of Organized Baseball's
major and minor league structure.7 The growing pains of the Nineteenth
Century were replaced by a new level of maturity as baseball assumed
its place as the "National Pastime." Against this backdrop of the
emergence of baseball as an American national sporting phenomenon
was the convergence of United States antitrust laws with the
organizational structure of professional baseball to produce the legal
framework which has remained baseball's hallmark and distinguishing
legal feature.
The creation of baseball's antitrust exemption began with the
demise of the upstart Federal League in 1915.8 In March 1913, the
Federal League was created with franchises in Baltimore, Brooklyn,
Buffalo, Chicago, Indianapolis, Kansas City, Pittsburgh, and St. Louis.
The Federal League promoted more harmonious relations with players
by using option clauses coupled with salary increases and the possibility
of free agency instead of the stricter reserve clauses used by the
recognized major leagues. 9 When the American and National Leagues
refused to recognize the Federal League and allow it to participate as
a member of the National Agreement1° prior to the 1914 season, the
Federal League escalated its efforts to become a third major league.
The Federal League aggressively sought to sign American and National
League players and minor league players with reserve clauses." l The
Federal League owners also embarked on a major building program
by constructing new stadiums between 1913 and 1914.
After two court skirmishes" concerning the signing of players from
National and American League teams, the Federal League filed an
7. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 82-83; .SEYMOUR, Early Years, supra note 6, at 307-
324.
8. For a discussion of the history of the Federal League, see Gary Hailey, Anatomy of
a Murder: The Federal League and the Courts, NAT'L PASTIME, Spring 1985 at 62; LEE
LOWENFISH, THE IMPERFECT DIAMOND: A HISTORY OF BASEBALL'S LABOR WARS 85-100 (Revised
edition 1991); LIONEL SOBEL, PROFESSIONAL SPORTS & THE LAW 1-7 (1977); HAROLD SEYMOUR,
BASEBALL: THE GOLDEN AGE 196-213 (1971).
9. LOWENFISH, supra note 8, at 86; SEYMOUR, THE GOLDEN AGE, supra note 8, at 201.
10. The National Agreement was an outgrowth of the January 1903 Peace Agreement
reached between the National and American Leagues and the National Association of Professional
Minor Leagues. The Agreement established a National Commission consisting of the presidents
of each league and a third member, Cincinnati Reds President August Herrmann. The major
features of the National Agreement was the enforcement of reserve clauses amongst all members
and the use of blacklisting against any party who failed to observe the reserve clause of
respective members. See LOWENFISH, supra note 8, at 70.
11. Sobel, supra note 8 at 2. ORGANIZED BASEBALL: REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
THE STUDY OF MONOPOLY POWER OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, H.R. REP. No. 2002,
82d Cong., 2d Sess. 50-57 (1952) [hereinafter 1952 ORGANIZED BASEBALL REPORT].
12. American League Baseball Club of Chicago v. Chase, 86 Misc. 441, 149 N.Y.S. 6
(Sup. Ct. 1914), Weeghman v. Killifer, 214 F. 168 (W.D. Mich.), aff'd, 215 F. 289 (6th Cir.
1914).
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antitrust action in Chicago on January 5, 1915. The case was assigned
to Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, noted for his "trustbusting"
decision against the Standard Oil Company. The Federal League's claim
was that the National Agreement's reserve and blacklisting system
constituted an unreasonable and illegal restraint of trade. Although
the trial was completed by late January, 3 Landis considered the
evidence for the entire 1915 season without rendering a ruling. Unable
to last competitively any longer, Federal League President James
Gilmore and Newark owner Harry Sinclair 14 struck a deal with
Organized Baseball on December 13, 1915.
The tentative peace agreement allowed each of the Federal League
owners to sell their players' contracts to the highest bidder after
declaring that all blacklisted players from the Federal League would
be declared eligible to play. The National League owners purchased
the Brooklyn Federals' stadium for $400,000. American League owners
had to pay one-half of that settlement. Chicago Federals owner Charles
E. Weeghman was allowed to purchase the Chicago Cubs and the
National League contributed $50,000 of the purchase price. The
Pittsburgh Federals were purchased by the National League owners
for $50,000. Buffalo and Kansas City had already dropped out of the
league for financial reasons before the end of the season. Phil Ball,
the owner of the St. Louis Federals team received the American League
franchise in St. Louis. Only the Baltimore franchise and its president
Carroll W. Rasin were left out of the agreement. 5
Baltimore filed suit in federal district court in Washington, D.C.
in 1917. The trial did not begin until March 1919. The Baltimore team
won a jury verdict assessing damages of $80,000.16 After trebling that
award and adding $24,000 in attorneys' fees, the final award was
$254,000.17 On appeal, lawyers for Organized Baseball contended that
their sport was neither "trade or commerce among the several States"1
8
and, therefore, the Sherman Act was inapplicable. The appellate court
agreed and reversed the district court decision. 9
13. Lowenfish, supra note 8 at 90.
14. Harry Sinclair had moved the Indianapolis franchise to Newark prior to the 1915
season. Sinclair gained notoriety as a principal in the Teapot Dome Scandal. See Hailey, supra
note 8 at 68.
15. Id.
16. Federal Baseball v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 208 (1922).
17. Hailey, supra note 8 at 71; 1952 ORGANIZED BASEBALL, supra note 11 at 57.
18. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1988)).
19. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs v. Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore,
269 F. 681 (D.C. Cir. 1921).
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Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rendered the Supreme Court's
unanimous decision on May 29, 1922. Holmes reasoned that
[t]he business is giving exhibitions of base ball, which are purely
state affairs .... That to which it is incident, the exhibition,
although made for money would not be called trade or commerce
in the commonly accepted use of those words. As it is put by the
defendants, personal effort, not related to production, is not the
subject of commerce.20
As a reward for his support of Organized Baseball and in the wake
of the 1919 Black Sox Scandal, 2' Judge Landis was named the first
Commissioner of Baseball on November 12, 1920. Landis established
himself as a strong-willed leader with his handling of the eight White
Sox players implicated in throwing the 1919 World Series. He ruled
Organized Baseball for the next quarter century of relative labor peace
until his death in November 1944.
DANNY GARDELLA AND THE ENTRY OF CONGRESS
During World War II, many of major league baseball's stars and
supporting cast were called away to participate in the war effort opening
roster spots for aging players as well as many mired in the minor
leagues. The end of the war would prompt a return of numerous former
major league players, and a number of players would be forced out
of their wartime occupation. 22 One player effected by the war's end
was Danny Gardella. Gardella, a minor league player from 1939
through 1941, was talked out of his job in a New York shipyard to
play outfield for the New York Giants in 1944 and 1945. Gardella
reported for spring training in 1946 unsigned and knowing his chances
of the making the Gians were slim.
Well aware of the abundance of talent and wanting to elevate his
league to a new level, Don Jorge Pasquel, president of the Mexican
League, together with his brother, Bernardo Pasquel, League vice
president, had begun a full-scale effort to attract major league stars
to Mexico 3.2 He succeeded in signing eighteen major league players to
20. 259 U.S. at 208-209.
21. For a discussion of the 1919 World Series and its legacy, see ELIOT ASINOF, EIGHT
MEN OUT: THE BLACK SOX AND THE 1919 WORLD SERIES (1963); DONALD GROPMAN, SAY IT
AIN'T SO, JOE! THE STORY OF SHOELESS JOE JACKSON (1979); HARVEY FROMMER, SHOELESS JOE
AND RAGTIME BASEBALL (1992).
22. Lowenfish, supra note 8 at 125.
23. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 8.
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contracts including Gardella. All eighteen players were suspended for
five years by Commissioner Happy Chandler for their transgressions.
Gardella filed suit in the Southern District of New York requesting
treble damages under sections 1, 2 and 3 of the Sherman Act24 and
sections two and three of the Clayton Act. 25 Judge Henry W. Goddard
dismissed the suit finding that Federal BasebalP6 was controlling.2 1 On
February 9, 1949, a three judge panel of the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals, in separate opinions, reversed Goddard's decision. 21 Judge
Jerome N. Frank, relying on subsequent Supreme Court decisions which
"completely destroyed the vitality' '29 of Federal Baseball and "left that
case but an impotent zombi [sicl," 30 joined with Judge Learned Hand
in remanding the case for trial.
Congressman A. S. "Syd" Herlong, a former minor league player
and executive, and Wilbur Mills responded to the Second Circuit
decision by introducing a bill in April 1949 to grant baseball an antitrust
exemption and to legalize the reserve clause.3 Gardella, together with
two other players3 2 who had left major league clubs to play in Mexico,
proceeded to request injunctive relief from the Southern District of
New York in order to return to their profession. Ruling that a
preliminary injunction would have granted the players complete relief
without a trial, the Southern District denied their requests and the
Second Circuit upheld the decision.33
Commissioner Chandler moved in June to preempt future court
action by granting amnesty to all blacklisted players.3 4 However,
Gardella had already headed to Canada to play in a league which
Organized Baseball had not blacklisted. One month prior to the
commencement of the trial, Gardella settled his suit with Commissioner
Chandler delaying judicial consideration of the reserve clause. 5
24. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-3, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
3 (1988)).
25. Clayton Act, ch. 323, §§ 3-4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 14-15 (1988)).
26. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
27. Gardella v. Chandler, 79 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
28. Gardella v. Chandler, 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949). For a discussion of the Gardella
case see Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., Organized Professional Team Sports and the Antitrust Laws,
43 CORNELL L.Q. 566, 569-573 (1958).
29. 172 F.2d at 408.
30. Id. at 408-409.
31. LOWENFISH, supra note 8, at 164.
32. Max Lanier and Fred Martin.
33. Gardella v. Chandler, 1949 CCH Trade Cases 62,412 (S.D.N.Y. 1949), aff'd, 174
F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1949), Martin v. Chandler, 149 CCH Trade Cases 62,397 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd, 174 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1949).
34. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 18; LOWENFISH, supra note 8, at 165-166.
35. SOBEL, supra note 8, at 19; LoWENFISH, supra note 8, at 167.
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Feeling that Judge Frank's position in the Gardella case had
supplanted the Federal Baseball position and pressured by the filing
of eight lawsuits against Organized Baseball, three bills were introduced
in 1951 in the House of Representatives16 and one in the Senate', that
would have granted all professional sports leagues an exemption from
antitrust laws.38 Lengthy hearings were held by Congressman Emanuel
Celler's Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power.3 9 The
subcommittee ultimately voted to recommend that the bills not be
passed because they felt that a complete exemption from the antitrust
laws was not warranted/ ° The subcommittee, noting changes both in
Supreme Court interpretations of commerce clause and the growth of
the minor league farm system and radio and television coverage of
baseball, stated that "it may be seriously doubted whether baseball
should now be regarded as exempt from the antitrust laws."14'
Determining that some form of a reserve clause was essential for the
operation of professional baseball, 42 the subcommittee argued that
legislation would be premature prior to judicial determination of
whether or not the reserve rules were legal under a rule of reason
analysis. 43
THE SUPREME COURT REAFFIRMS FEDERAL BASEBALL IN TOOLSON V.
NEW YORK YANKEES
Although assuring the Congressional subcommittee that the reserve
system would be tested under the rule of reason, lawyers for Organized
Baseball were arguing in federal courts that the Federal Baseball
decision was correct and baseball was still beyond the reach of antitrust
law. Their position was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Toolson
36. H.R. 4229, H.R. 4230, H.R. 4231, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
37. S. 1526, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951).
38. The three House bills, H.R. 4229, H.R. 4230, and H.R. 4231, provided that the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act, and the Robinson-Patman
Act "shall not apply to organized professional sports enterprises or to acts in the conduct of
such enterprises." The only difference in S. 1526 was the lack of mention of the Robinson-
Patman Act. Id. For a brief discussion of the legislation see Pierce, supra note 24 at 573.
39. Hearings before the Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power of the Committee
on the Judiciary, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951) [hereinafter 1951 Hearings]. See LOWENFISH,
supra note 8, at 171-181.
40. 1952 Organized Baseball Report, supra note 11, at 230.
41. Id. at 135.
42. Id. at 229.
43. Id. at 231-232. See also LOWENFISH, supra note 8, at 180-181.
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v. New York Yankees,44 a decision combining three lower court
decisions.
4 5
George Toolson had brought an action against the New York
Yankees for treble damages under sections one and two of the Sherman
Act 4 and section four of the Clayton Act .4 Toolson was under contract
with the Newark International Baseball Club, a farm team for the New
York Yankees, when his contract was assigned to Binghamton. Toolson
refused to report and was, therefore, placed on the "ineligible list"
of the Binghamton team. This effectively blacklisted Toolson from
playing with any other baseball team.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
California held for the Yankees citing Federal Baseball" as controlling.
Judge Harrison listed numerous citations to Federal Baseball and noted
that only Gardella9 had challenged its validity. The judge concluded
that he was bound by Federal Baseball and could not disregard it. He
noted the ongoing Congressional hearings and that Congress had the
power to determine the issue before him. He dismissed the case for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in a per curiam
opinion. 0
On November 9, 1953, the Supreme Court issued a terse one
paragraph majority per curiam opinion, finding that
Congress has had the ruling (Federal Baseball) under consideration
but has not seen fit to bring such business under these laws by
legislation having prospective effect. The business has been left
for thirty years to develop, on the understanding that it was not
subject to existing antitrust legislation. The present cases ask us
to overrule the prior decision and, with retrospective effect, hold
the legislation applicable. We think that ifothere are evils in this
field which now warrant application to it of the antitrust laws it
should be legislation. Without re-examination of the underlying
issues, the judgments below are affirmed on the authority of Federal
Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional
Baseball Clubs... so far as that decision determines that Congress
44. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
45. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 101 F. Supp. 93 (S.D. Cal. 1951), aff'd, 200 F.2d
198 (9th Cir. 1952); Kowalski v. Chandler, 202 F.2d 413 (6th Cir. 1953); Corbett v. Chandler,
202 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1953).
46. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-2, 26 Stat. 210 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-
2 (1988)).
47. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 4, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 15 (1988).
48. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
49. 172 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1949).
50. 200 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1952).
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had no intention of including the business of baseball within the
scope of the Federal antitrust laws.5
Justice Burton issued a strongly worded dissent which Justice Reed
joined. Burton argued that
Whatever may have been the situation when the Federal Baseball
case... was decided in 1922, I am not able to join today's decision
which, in effect, announces that organized baseball, in 1953, still
is not engaged in interstate trade or commerce.
5 2
Burton quoted the 1952 Judiciary Subcommittee report 53 to support
his argument that baseball was interstate in nature before attacking
the basic premise of the majority opinion.
In the Federal Baseball Club case the Court did not state that even
if the activities of organized baseball amounted to interstate trade
or commerce those activities were exempt from the Sherman Act.
The court acted on its determination that the activities before it
did not amount to interstate commerce.
54
Turning the Congressional issue around, Burton stated
Congress, however, has enacted no express exemption of organized
baseball from the Sherman Act, and no court has demonstrated
the existence of an implied exemption from that Act of any sport
that is so highly organized as to amount to an interstate monopoly
or which restrains interstate trade or commerce. In the absence
of such an exemption, the present popularity of organized baseball
increases, rather than.diminishes, the importance of its compliance
with standards of reasonableness comparable with those now
required by. law of interstate trade or commerce. It is interstate
trade or commerce and, as such, it is subject to the Sherman Act
until exempted.
55
Professor Lionel Sobel adroitly noted in Professional Sports and
the Law,5 6 that the Toolson decision can be assailed on four grounds.
First, Congressional legislation was not, as the court implied, targeted
51. 346 U.S. at 356-7.
52. 346 U.S. at 357.
53. Id. at 358. See 1952 ORGANIZED BASEBALL REPORT, supra note 11.
54. 346 U.S. at 358.
55. Id. at 364-365.
56. SOBEL, supra note 8.
0
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at overturning Federal Baseball. 7 Instead, the legislation "would have
reactivated the exemption Congress believed no longer existed." 5
Second, Sobel attacked the court's determination that Congress did
not intend to include baseball within the antitrust proscription. Instead,
the Court had found that baseball was not interstate commerce as
understood in 1922. Third, Sobel noted that the Court ignored its own
subsequent decisions as noted by Judge Frank in his Gardella opinion. 9
Fourth, because no trial was held there was no showing that Organized
Baseball had relied upon its exemption. "Moreover, all of the actions
which gave rise to the lawsuits decided by the Court in Toolson were
taken after the decision of the Court of Appeals in Gardella v.
Chandler. Even if Organized Baseball had in fact relied upon its
exemption prior to Gardella, reliance thereafter hardly would have been
justified."' 6 An additional point not added by Sobel was the Court's
insistence that Congressional action would have a prospective effect.
Also, the Court felt that a decision to overrule prior case law would
apply the Sherman and Clayton acts retrospectively. This concern over
the possibility of extensive litigation over previous activities of Major
League Baseball foreshadowed more extensive discussion of this issue
in Flood v. Kuhn.
61
In response to the Toolson decision, the Senate held hearings in
March, April, and May 1954 on Senate Joint Resolution 133.62 The
resolution, proposed by Senator Edwin C. Johnson of Colorado,
originally proposed to remove the antitrust exemption from any baseball
team owned by a brewer. In particular, the legislation targeted the
acquisition of the St. Louis Cardinals by August A. Busch, Jr.,
President of the Anheuser Busch, Inc. Johnson was concerned that
lower court opinions dealing with boxing and legitimate theatre were
threatening the viability of the Toolson decision. Assistant Attorney
General Stanley W. Barnes testified against the measure in March, 1954
because it targeted only teams owned by breweries rather than all
baseball teams, and created difficulties with enforcement. 6a The
57. Id. at 28.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 29. Sobel points to Frank's numerous citations listed in footnotes 7a, b, & c
of his opinion in Gardella, 172 F.2d at 412. Of particular importance is the Supreme Court's
decision in United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U.S. 533 (1944) which
overruled Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895). Hooper was one of the few cases cited
in Federal Baseball, 259 U.S. at ,209.
60. Id. at 29.
61. 407 U.S. 258, 283 (1972).
62. Hearings on S.J. Res. 133 Subjecting Professional Baseball Clubs to Antitrust Laws
before the Committee on the Judiciary, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
63. Id. at 4-5.
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resolution was amended prior to the May hearings in order to include
any team owned by any corporation subject to the antitrust laws6
Senator Johnson's amendments were targeted at the position taken by
the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice that the Toolson
decision needed to be reversed in order to protect the broad application
of antitrust laws to other industries. 65 Ultimately, the Senate took no
action on the proposal.
Soon after rendering the Toolson decision, the Supreme Court
further confused the jurisprudence in this area by determining in
subsequent decisions concerning legitimate theatre, 66 boxing, 67 and
football68 that Federal Baseball did not extend federal antitrust
immunity to these industries.
RADOVICH V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
Of particular importance was the Supreme Court's decision in
Radovich v. National Football League.69 Radovich played for the
Detroit Lions in the National Football League in 1945. Prior to the
beginning of the 1946 season, Radovich requested a trade to the Los
Angeles Rams in order to be near his father who was ill. After the
Lions refused Radovich's request, he signed with the Los Angeles Dons
of the All-America Conference. He played with the Dons for two
seasons. In 1948, Radovich was offered a player-coach position with
the San Francisco Clippers of the Pacific Coast League. However, the
Clippers were informed by the National Football League that it would
be severely penalized for employing Radovich who had been blacklisted
for jumping to the rival league. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
70
held that under the Federal Baseball and Toolson decisions, football
was exempt from antitrust scrutiny.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit
fashioning a narrow use of stare decisis in determining that Federal
Baseball and Toolson applied only to professional baseball. Squarely
placing the issue before Congress, the Court declared that:
64. Id. at 67-68.
65. Id. at 69.
66. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 22 (1956).
67. United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
68. Radovich v. National Football League, 358 U.S. 445 (1957). For contemporary
discussions of Radovich, see Maxwell Keith, Developments in the Application of Antitrust
Laws to Professional Team Sports, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 119 (1958); Recent Development,
Professional Football Held Within Purview of Sherman Act, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 725 (1957),
Robert C. Webb, Note, 36 N.C. L. REV. 315 (1958).
69. Id.
70. 231 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1956).
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Congressional processes are more accommodative, affording the
whole industry hearings and an opportunity to assist in the
formulation of new legislation. The resulting product is therefore
more likely to protect the industry and the public alike. The whole
scope of congressional action would be known long in advance
and effective dates for the legislation could be set in the future
without the injustices of retroactively and surprise which might
follow court action.
71
In June 1957, the House Antitrust Committee held fifteen days
of hearings72 on seven different bills. 73 H.R. 5383 created a complete
exemption from antitrust laws for all professional team sports. H.R.
5307 and H.R. 5319 required that professional baseball would join all
other team sports within the purview of antitrust scrutiny. The other
four bills established an exemption for certain league practices within
the context of antitrust coverage for all team sports. H.R. 6876 and
H.R. 6877 exempted playing rules, league organization, territorial
allocations, and player employment matters. The two bills, however,
did provide players with the right to unionize for the purpose of
collective bargaining. H.R. 8023 also allowed an exemption for a
modified reserve clause if the clause did not exceed five years in duration
and the compensation to the player was increased by fifteen percent
in each of the last two years of the contract. H.R. 8124, provided the
same exemptions as H.R. 6876 and H.R. 6877, while also providing
antitrust protection for the league's player selection drafts.
The impact of radio and television rights, particularly with respect
to the minor leagues, was a point of emphasis of Commissioner Ford
Frick and George Trautman, President of the National Association.
7 4
Broadcasts of major league games into minor league markets had
reduced interest in attendance and broadcasting of minor league games.
The Department of Justice, moreover, threatened antitrust action
against Major League Baseball if it attempted to restrict broadcasts
into minor league territories. 75 Despite the significant attention created
by the numerous legislative initiatives, the lengthy hearings, and the
impact of the Radovich decision, the first session of the 85th Congress,
did not report any legislation out of committee.
71. 352 U.S. at 452.
72. Hearings on H.R. 5307, Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee on the
Judiciary, 85th Congress, 1st Sess. (1957) [hereinafter 1957 Hearings].
73. H.R. 5307, H.R. 5319, H.R. 5383, H.R. 6876, H.R. 6877. H.R. 8023, and H.R.
8124, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957).
74. 1957 Hearings, supra note 72, at 101-103 and 190-191.
75. Id. at 102.
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More hearings followed in 1958 after Emanuel Celler introduced
a bill 76 to place all professional sports under antitrust laws with the
express exemption of activities which were "reasonably necessary" to
the "(1) equalization of competitive playing strengths; (2) the right to
operate within specific geographic areas; and (3) the preservation of
public confidence in the honesty of sports contests." 77 The House
Judiciary Committee favorably reported the legislation out of
Committee urging the full House to pass it.78 The Committee noted
that the legislation was targeted towards removing the per se
implications and allowing a rule of reason analysis.7 9 When the bill
reached the House floor, however, it was amended ° to omit the
"reasonably necessary" language in order to exempt the player draft,
the reserve clause, and exclusive territorial allocation. H.R. 10378 was
passed with the amendment.8 The bill was sent to the Senate, and,
although twelve days of hearings were conducted by the Senate
Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee
on the Judiciary,8 2 no action was taken by the Subcommittee.
Samuel R. Pierce, Jr., writing for the Cornell Law Quarterly in
1958, pushed Congress to enact legislation because "the judiciary,
through its unfamiliarity in this field and by indiscriminately applying
conventional per se concepts, may completely destroy the foundations
upon which these sports are built." 83 Pierce argued that complete
immunity from antitrust scrutiny "would be absolutely unjustified,
' 84
allowing leagues to avoid antitrust liability for any type of business
activity including restraints on broadcasting rights. However, Pierce
argued that allowing complete coverage by antitrust laws would also
be unwarranted. Pierce felt that such action would prompt substantial
and costly litigation in an area of unsettled law. The resulting
"economic instability" would create "an attendant detrimental effect
upon athletic competition, players, sports fans, and the communities
in which clubs operate." 8 Pierce also rejected suggestions for a
governmental agency to regulate team sports.8 6 Pierce proposed the
76. H.R. 10378, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
77. Id. For a criticism of the "lack of definiteness" in the "reasonably necessary"
language, see Pierce, supra note 28 at 579 and 610-611.
78. H. Rep. 1720, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
79. Id. at 7.
80. 104 CONG. REc. 12,098 (1958).
81. Id. at 12,105.
82. Hearings on H.R. 10378 and S. 4070 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1958).
83. Pierce, supra note 28 at 606.
84. Id. at 607.
85. Id. at 608.
86. Id. at 609.
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grant of a partial exemption to team sports. Believing that the reserve
system was necessary, Pierce argued that a team should be allowed
to use the reserve clause to protect their interest in a player as long
as he stayed within the league; however, use of the reserve system to
prevent a player from moving to another league would be prohibited.
In exchange for Congressional approval of the reserve system, salary
arbitration was offered to offset management power in salary
negotiations. Although arguing that labor unionization in sports had
been "nothing but failure," '8 7 Pierce would have predicated any
exemption for the reserve clause on allowing the use of collective
bargaining. The draft and geographical territorial allocations would
also have been provided with an exemption. In the area of broadcast
rights, Pierce promoted blackouts within a team's home territory, but
he would not have allowed any restrictions upon radio broadcasting.
The author would not have provided an exemption to protect the farm
system. Pierce also argued that the proposed legislation should not have
retroactive effect.
88
The 86th Congress considered bills introduced by Senators
Hennings, Dirksen and Keating 89 and Estes Kefauver. 9° The Hennings-
Dirksen-Keating initiatives was comparable to that considered by the
85th Congress. Keating noted that "[o]ne of the problems of these
sports given special treatment in the bill is the regulation of the
telecasting of major league games into minor league areas. No one who
considers the plight of the minor leagues under the present broadcasting
policy of the majors would disagree with the necessity for such
provisions." 91 Kefauver's bill exempted practices designed to equalize
team playing strengths, exclusive territorial assignments, actions to
preserve honesty, and the regulation of radio and television
broadcasting of sports contests.
Hearings were conducted on both legislative initiatives. 92 After the
hearings, Kefauver introduced another bill which was reported
favorably by the Antitrust Subcommittee in the fall of 1959. A third
initiative from Kefauver 93 distinguished between the activities of
87. Id. at 613.
88. Id. at 614.
89. S. 616, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For a discussion of the legislation see Kenneth
B. Keating, The Antitrust Threat to Professional Team Sports, 1959 ANTITRUST LAW SYMPOSIUM
at 23.
90. S. 886, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
91. Keating, supra note 89 at 25.
92. Hearings on S. 616 and S. 886 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959).
93. S. 3483, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959). For a lengthy discussion of this bill and its
consideration by the Judiciary Committee see Sobel, supra note 8 at 43-47.
THURGOOD MARSHALL LA W REVIEW
football, basketball and hockey and baseball. It would have forced
each major league team to limit its reserve list to forty veteran players.
The impetus for the particular language of this bill was the actions
of organizers of a rival major league, the Continental League.
Ultimately the Subcommittee report94 produced no recommendation
on the legislation.
The bill was debated before the full Senate in June 1960. 95 A
motion to recommit the bill to the Subcommittee passed, 96 and another
Congressional session produced no legislation. The House considered
a number of bills similar to the amended Celler bill considered by the
85th Congress. Hearings were held in September 1959 by the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary. 97
In 1961 Congress reacted swiftly in passing legislation9" to allow
all professional team sports to collectively negotiate for the national
television package. The legislation was prompted by Judge Allan K.
Grim's 1961 decision" holding that his earlier order'0° prevented the
National Football League's package deal that it had negotiated with
Columbia Broadcasting System.
The 87th Congress considered another bill' 01 from Senator
Kefauver which was similar to S. 3483. Senator Hart introduced
legislation '02 to treat all team sports similarly. No hearings, however,
were held. The bills were reported to the full Judiciary Committee by
the Antitrust Subcommittee, but they were not reported out of the full
Senate. Members of the House of Representatives introduced three
bills'03 similar to Hart's bill.
Senator Hart proceeded to introduce similar legislation before the
88th Congress.'°4 Hearings were held in January and February, 1964.105
The Judiciary Committee favorably reported'0 6 the bill to the Senate
in July, but the measure was not considered. The House of
94. S. Rep. No. 1620, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
95. 106 CONG. REC. 14,728-33, 14,738-50 (1960).
96. Id. at 14,749-50.
97. Hearings on H.R. 2370 before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the House Committee
on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (not printed).
98. 15 U.S.C. § 1291-1295 (1988).
99. United States v. National Football League, 196 F. Supp. 445 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
100. United States v. National Football League, 116 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. 1953).
101. S. 168, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
102. S. 1856, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
103. H.R. 178, H.R. 323, H.R. 1147, 97th Cong., ist Sess. (1961).
104. S. 2391, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
105. Hearings on S. 2391 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964).
106. S. Rep. 1303, 88th Cong. (1964).
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Representatives saw the active introduction of fourteen bills, but no
action was taken.
On February 2, 1965, Senator Hart again introduced legislation0 7
to place football, hockey, and basketball on equal antitrust terms with
baseball. Hearings were conducted with special attention devoted to
the acquisition of the New York Yankees by the Columbia Broadcasting
System. 10 The Judiciary Committee sent the bill to the full Senate with
its endorsement."5 9 The bill was debated on the Senate floor on August
31, 1965,110 and a number of amendments were proposed. Senator Sam
Ervin introduced an amendment to remove the exemption for the
college player draft for athletes leaving school before the end of their
eligibility, thus allowing freedom to bargain for every college athlete."'
Ervin's amendment was defeated." 2
Senator William Proxmire proposed an amendment to require all
teams to divide evenly all television revenue." 3 Proxmire was
undoubtedly concerned about the eminent move of the Braves from
Milwaukee to Atlanta. The Braves were being lured in part by the
promise of increased television revenue. However, the amendment was
easily defeated. "
4
Having beating back numerous attempts to amend the Hart
initiative, the Senate passed the bill." 5 The House of Representatives,
however, did not consider the legislation. Another flurry of
Congressional activity had failed to produce an act to alter baseball's
relationship with federal antitrust laws.
During 1966 Congress turned away from a discussion of baseball's
antitrust status to a consideration of a proposed merger between the
American Football League and the National Football League. After
passing a bill approving the merger as part of the investment tax credit
bill, Congress retreated from the discussion of baseball's peculiar status
as the Supreme Court prepared for the third time to consider baseball's
reserve system against the backdrop of alleged violations of antitrust
laws.
Three noteworthy events in 1966 would help shape the future of
professional baseball. Sandy Koufax and Don Drysdale, pitching stars
107. The Professional Sports Act of 1965, S. 950, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
108. Hearings on S. 950 before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
109. S. Rep. 462, 89th Cong. (1965).
110. 111 CoNG. REc. 22,298-330 (1965).
I11. Id. at 22,305.
112. Id. at 22,318.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 22,326.
115. Id. at 22,329.
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for the Los Angeles Dodgers, had hired Hollywood agent J. William
Hayes to negotiate a package deal for the upcoming year under threat
of a dual holdhout. Although Dodgers' owner Walter O'Malley was
appalled at the thought of dealing with an agent, he was ultimately
forced to relent and offer the two players significant salary increases.
After twelve years in Milwaukee and despite two National League
pennants and strong fan support, the Braves moved to Atlanta in order
to stake claim to the lucrative Southeastern television market. The state
of Wisconsin sued the National League alleging a violation of state
antitrust law. In Wisconsin v. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.16 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ruled that state antitrust law was inapplicable and held
that baseball's federal antitrust exemption required dismissal of the
case.
In a move less noticed by the public but ultimately more important
in the development of labor relations between ownership and players,
the Major League Baseball Players Association hired their first
executive director, former Steelworkers Union official Marvin Miller." 7
THE FLOOD DECISION
118
During the 1960's, centerfield for the St. Louis Cardinals was the
domain of Curt Flood. Flood, a seven time Gold Glove Award winner
with a lifetime average of .293 was co-captain during the 1965-1969
season. The Cardinals participated in the World Series in 1964, 1967,
and 1968. In October 1969, the Cardinals traded Flood to the
Philadelphia Phillies. Aggravated by the Cardinals insensitive treatment
after twelves years of service, Flood approached Miller about suing
Major League Baseball. Ultimately, the Executive Board of the Major
League Baseball Players Association voted unanimously to underwrite
Flood's case, and former Supreme Court Justice Arthur Goldberg was
hired to represent Flood."19
Flood brought suit against Organized Baseball claiming that the
enforcement of baseball's reserve system violated federal and state
116. 31 Wis. 2d 699, 144 N.W.2d 1, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 990 (1966).
117. See Marvin Miller, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE SPORTS AND BUSINESS OF
BASEBALL 3-10, 33-62 (1991).
118. For a discussion of the Flood case from the position of the main combatants, see
CURT FLOOD, THE WAY IT Is (1971); MARVIN MILLER, A WHOLE DIFFERENT BALL GAME: THE
SPORT AND BUSINESS OF BASEBALL 170-202 (1991); BowIE KUHN, HARDBALL: THE EDUCATION
OF A BASEBALL COMMISSIONER 74-90 (1987).
119. For a brief appraisal of Goldberg's involvement in the case and Justice Blackmun's
opinion, see BoB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 189-192 (1979).
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antitrust laws, state common law, federal anti-peonage statutes, the
thirteenth amendment, and federal labor laws. 120
The District Court for the Southern District of New York held
first that Flood was not entitled to a preliminary injunction establishing
him as a free agent.' 21 Such a result would not have maintained the
status quo, but would rather have granted him his ultimate relief.
Furthermore, there was no showing of sufficient probability of ultimate
success on the merits to warrant injunctive relief.
Defendants subsequently moved for dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, failure to join indispensable parties, and for
summary judgment on the fifth cause of action which involved the
ownership of the St. Louis Cardinals by Anheuser-Busch, Inc. and the
New York Yankees by the Columbia Broadcasting System. 22 Summary
judgment was granted for the Cardinals and the Yankees, 23 but the
motions to dismiss on the first four causes of action were deferred
until trial. '2
At trial, 25 Judge Irving Ben Cooper analyzed the necessity of the
reserve system before turning to a discussion of Federal Baseball,26
Toolson, 27 and the recent Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision
in Salerno v. American League. 28 Cooper concluded that
Salerno mandates that plaintiff's federal antitrust claims be denied.
Since baseball remains exempt from the antitrust laws unless and
until the Supreme Court or Congress holds to the contrary, we
have no basis for proceeding to the underlying question of whether
baseball's reserve system would or would not be deemed reasonable
if it were in fact subject to antitrust regulation. 2 9
Cooper also turned aside the state law claims 30 and the involuntary
servitude claim. '31
This decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit. 3 2 Judge Waterman asserted that [iut appears
120. See note 2 infra.
121. 309 F. Supp. 793.
122. Flood v. Kuhn, 312 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
123. Id. at 409-410.
124. Id. at 411.
125. Flood v. Kuhn, 316 F. Supp. 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
126. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
127. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
128. 429 F.2d 1003 (2d Cir. 1970).
129. 316 F. Supp. at 278.
130. Id. at 278-280.
131. Id. at 280-282.
132. Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264 (2d. Cir. 1971).
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to be without question that, today, professional baseball . . . is
interstate commerce."' 33 However, in ruling against Flood's position
on state law claims, Waterman found
Hence, as the burden on interstate commerce outweighs the states'
interests in regulating baseball's reserve system, the Commerce
Clause precludes the application here of state antitrust law.
34
Judge Cooper decided that baseball was exempt from antitrust
scrutiny under Federal Baseball and Toolson, that baseball's federal
antitrust exemption pre-empted any state regulation and the reserve
system did not constitute involuntary servitude.'35
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the opinion of the
Second Circuit on June 19, 1972.136 Justice Blackmun delivered the
court's opinion. 1
37
Blackmun's decision began with a long historical discussion of the
origins of baseball including a listing of numerous great players., 3 He
analyzed the baseball records of Curt Flood including his salaries. 
39
In affirming the decision of the lower courts, Blackmun discussed in
sequence Federal Baseball,'4° Toolson, '4' United States v. Shubert, 1
42
Radovich4 3 and International Boxing Club.144 He concluded his
discussion of prior case history with the discussion of Haywood v.
National Basketball Association 45 which held that basketball did not
enjoy an exemption from the antitrust laws. In part five Blackmun
concluded
1. Professional baseball is a business and it is engaged in interstate
commerce.
2. With its reserve system enjoying exemption from the federal
antitrust laws, baseball is, in a very distinct sense, an exception
133. Id. at 267.
134. Id. at 268.
135. 316 F. Supp. 271.
136. Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
137. Stewart and Rehnquist joined in all but part one which Burger and White joined.
Burger filed a separate concurring opinion and Douglas and Marshall filed dissents. Brennan
joined in the dissents.
138. 407 U.S. at 262-263.
139. Id. at 264-265.
140. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
141. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
142. 348 U.S. 222 (1955).
143. 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
144. 348 U.S. 236 (1955).
145. 401 U.S. 1204 (1971).
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and an anomaly. Federal Baseball and Toolson have become an
aberration confined to baseball.
3. Even though others might regard this as "unrealistic,
inconsistent, or illogical," see Radovich, 352 U.S., at 452, the
aberration is an established one, and one that has been recognized
not only in Federal Baseball and Toolson, but in Shubert,
International Boxing, and Radovich, as well, a total of five
consecutive cases in this Court. It is an aberration that has been
with us now for half a century, one heretofore deemed fully entitled
to the benefit of stare decisis, and one that has survived the Court's
expanding concept of interstate commerce. It rests on a recognition
and an acceptance of baseball's unique characteristics and needs.
4. Other professional sports operating interstate-football, boxing,
basketball, and, presumably, hockey ... and golf . . .- are not
so exempt.
5. The advent of radio and television, with their consequent
increased coverage and additional revenues, has not occasioned an
overruling of Federal Baseball and Toolson.
6. The Court has emphasized that since 1922 baseball, with full
and continuing congressional awareness, has been allowed to
develop and to expand unhindered by federal legislative action.
Remedial legislation has been introduced repeatedly in Congress
but none has ever been enacted. The Court, accordingly, has
concluded that Congress as yet has had no intention to subject
baseball's reserve system to the reach of the antitrust statutes. This,
obviously, has been deemed to be something other than mere
congressional silence and passivity....
7. The Court has expressed concern about the confusion and the
retroactivity problems that inevitably would result with a judicial
overturning of Federal Baseball. It has voiced a preference that
if any change is to be made, it come by legislative action that, by
its nature, is only prospective in operation. l 6
The Court upheld the Second Circuit's ruling on the state antitrust
law claim and did not reach the question of whether the reserve system
was a mandatory subject of collective bargaining and exempted from
the operation of antitrust laws. 
147
Chief Justice Warren Burger's concurring opinion noted his "grave
reservations as to the correctness of Toolson."'14 He urged Congress
"to solve this problem.'
1 49
146. 407 U.S. at 282-283.
147. Id. at 285.
148. Id. at 285-286.
149. Id. at 286.
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Justice Douglas in his dissent, which Justice Brennan joined,
argued that Federal Baseball "is a derelict in the stream of the law
that we, its creator, should remove."' 50 Noting that the concept of
commerce had changed significantly since 1922, Douglas closed by
quoting Radovich
There can be no doubt "that were we considering the question of
baseball for the first time upon a clean slate," we would hold it
(baseball) to be subject to federal antitrust regulation. The unbroken
silence of Congress should not prevent us from correcting our own
mistake."'
Marshall's dissent, also joined by Brennan, focused on the
involuntary servitude issue. Marshall argued that "(s)ince baseball is
interstate commerce, if we re-examine baseball's antitrust exemption,
the Court's decisions in . . . Shubert . . . . International Boxing Club
... and Radovich . . . require that we bring baseball within the
coverage of the antitrust laws.'1 2 Douglass also noted that the lack
of Congressional activity did not mandate the Court's refusal to
overturn Federal Baseball and Toolson. 53 Marshall would have
overruled both Federal Baseball and Toolson; however he stated that
the labor exemption might not allow Flood to prevail. 54
POST-FLOOD CONGRESSIONAL ACTIVITY
Congressional action in response to the Flood decision was limited.
In October 1975, the House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings5
on two bills 5 6 which would "have voided the standard player contract
as anticompetitive." 5' The hearings concentrated not on Major League
Baseball, however, but on the activities of the National Football
League.
Senator Alan Cranston introduced legislation'58 in the 96th
Congress in June 1979. His bill would have repealed the antitrust
150. Id.
151. Id. at 288.
152. Id. at 291.
153. Id. at 292.
154. Id. at 293-296.
155. Hearings on the Rights of Professional Athletes and H.R. 2355 and H.R. 694 before
the Subcommittee on Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee,
94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Hearings].
156. H.R. 694, H.R. 2355, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
157. 1975 Hearings, supra note 153 at 2.
158. S. 1303, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
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exemption and prohibited specific territorial restrictions. Similar
legislation was introduced in the House of Representatives by
Congressman Seiberling. 5 9 Additional legislation was also introduced
in the House concerning broadcasting.w In 1980, Senator Magnuson
introduced legislation in the Senate concerning franchise relocation.16
The mid-season baseball strike of 1981 coupled with the 1982
football strike prompted the introduction of legislation in the 97th
Congress. In April 1981, the Sports Antitrust Reform Act of 1981162
was introduced in the House of Representatives by John Seiberling.
The bill Would have repealed baseball's antitrust exemption while
restricting the exercise of exclusive territorial restrictions in professional
sports. The House held hearings in 1982163 to consider Seiberling's bill
as well the Sports Franchise Relocation Act' 64 and the Professional
Sports Stabilization Act of 1982, introduced by Congressmen Henry
Hyde, Fortney Stark, and Don Edwards. 65 None of these bills were
acted upon. Discussions were held on the House floor on September
30, 1982.'6
In August and September 1982, the Senate Judiciary Committee
held hearings on two bills' 67 introduced by Senators Dennis DeConcini
and Arlen Specter prompted by the move of the Oakland Raiders to
Los Angeles. DeConcini's bill, the "Major League Sports Community
Protection Act of 1982," was specifically targeted towards allowing
leagues to determine when a member franchise could relocate. The
legislation contained a further provision that the act would create no
changes in existing antitrust treatment of "any player employment
matter." 68 Specter's bill, the "Professional Football Stabilization Act
of 1982," was even more specifically focused on professional football.
Section four of S. 2821 listed three requirements 69 prior to allowing
159. H.R. 2129, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
160. H.R. 1239, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
161. S. 3183, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980).
162. H.R. 3287, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
163. Hearings on Antitrust Policy and Professional Sports before the Subcommittee on
Monopolies and Commercial Law of the House Judiciary Committee, 97th Cong., 1st & 2d
Sess. (1982).
164. H.R. 823, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
165. H.R. 6467, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
166. 128 CONG. REC. 11,170 (1982).
167. S. 2784, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), S. 2821, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
168. S. 2874, sec. 3 (1982).
169. The requirements were (1) a failure by one or more parties "to comply with a
provision of material significance to the (stadium lease) agreement," and no attempt to remedy
the non-compliance within a reasonable time period, (2) an inadequate stadium with no intent
to remedy the inadequacies, and (3) three years of annual net loss prior to relocation or loses
during a shorter time period which endangered the "continued financial viability of the team."
S. 282, sec. 4 (1982).
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a professional football team with six years in a community from
relocating.
In the 98th Congress, the Senate held hearings in 1984170 on the
Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act. 7 ' The House
Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism held
hearings 7 1 on similar legislation.' 7 Similar legislation was introduced
in the 99th Congress.1 74 During the 100th Congress, two bills 75 were
introduced concerning the air broadcasting of baseball games.
By the end of the 1980's, Major League Baseball's antitrust
exemption had withstood another decade of Congressional assault
despite the intense interest over the franchise relocations of the Raiders,
Colts and Clippers: In order to determine the continued viability of
baseball's unusual antitrust status in the 1990's, the scene has once
again changed to the judiciary. The failure to successfully move the
San Francisco Giants to Florida has refocused the federal courts on
the parameters of baseball antitrust exemption.
PIAZZA V. MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
In the fallout surrounding the failure to purchase the San Francisco
Giants and move them to St. Petersburg 176 Vincent M. Piazza, Vincent
N. Tirendi and PT Baseball, Inc. sued Major League Baseball claiming
violations of the first and fifth amendments,' 177 a section 1983178 action,
170. Hearings on the Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
171. S. 2505, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
172. Hearings on Professional Sports Team Community Protection Act before the
Subcommittee on Commerce, Transportation, and Tourism of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
173. H.R. 5388, 5430, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984).
174. Sports Community Protection and Stability Act of 1985, S. 298, 99th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1985).
175. H.R. 2687, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987); H.R. 2593, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1989).
176. See note 4 infra.
177. U.S. CONST. amend. I & V. Piazza and Tirendi alleged that Major League Baseball
violated their first and fifth amendment rights by "(1) depriving them of their liberty and
property interests and privileges without due process of law, (2) denying them equal protection
of the laws, and (3) impairing their freedom of contract and association. Piazza v. Major
League Baseball, 831 F. Supp. 420, 423 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
178. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Piazza and Tirendi claimed Major League Baseball acted
under color of state law because "(a) Baseball is exempt from liability under state antitrust
laws; (b) there is a close nexus and symbiotic relatiohiship between Baseball and state and local
governments; and (c) Baseball acted in concert with the City of San Francisco to prevent the
Giants from being relocated." 831 F. Supp. at 423.
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and a violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 179 Major League
Baseball moved to dismiss claiming that the district court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over federal and state claims and that Piazza and
Tirendi's federal claims failed to state a cause of action. 80 Major League
Baseball also claimed that they were exempt from antitrust liability
under Federal Baseball'' and its progeny.
8 2
In August 1992, Piazza and Tirendi agreed to form a limited
partnership with four Florida residents to purchase the San Francisco
Giants and move them to St. Petersburg, Florida. The Investors
executed a Letter of Intent with Giants owner Robert Lurie to purchase
the team for $115 million. Defendant Ed Kuhlman, Chairman of the
Major League Baseball Ownership Committee, authorized a
background check of Piazza, Tirendi and the other investors in response
to the submission of an application to Major League Baseball to
purchase the Giants. Kuhlman and Ownership Committee member Jerry
Reinsdorf subsequently stated that the background check had raised
question about plaintiffs. Plaintiffs claimed that the implications
associated them with the Mafia or organized crime. They were not
appraised of the charges against them, given an opportunity to be heard,
nor had they dropped out of the partnership. Major League Baseball
ultimately accepted an alternative offer for $15 million less in order
to keep the franchise in San Francisco.'83
Judge John R. Padova first analyzed the standard of review before
turning to a discussion of the direct constitutional claims which he
dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Padova next turned
to the section 1983 action, and, in particular, the association of Major
League Baseball to the city of San Francisco. Feeling that plaintiffs
had shown sufficient facts to conclude that Major League Baseball
had acted "under color of state law," Padova denied Major League
Baseball's motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim.' 84
Padova next considered Major League Baseball's motion to dismiss
the antitrust claims because "(1) plaintiffs have failed to allege that
Baseball's actions restrained competition in a relevant market; (2)
plaintiffs have no standing to assert a Sherman Act claim; and (3)
Baseball is exempt from liability under the Sherman Act."' 85
1
179. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988). Piazza and Tirendi claimed that "Baseball has monopolized
the market for Major League Baseball teams and that Baseball has placed direct and indirect
restraints on the purchase, sale, transfer, relocation of, and competition for such terms." 831
F. Supp. at 423-424.
180. 831 F. Supp. at 421.
181. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
182. 831 F. Supp. at 420.
183. Id. at 422-423.
184. Id. at 424-425.
185. Id. at 429.
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In discussing the relevant market contention, Padova considered
Major League Baseball's claim that plaintiffs were seeking to join Major
League Baseball rather than compete with it. Padova offered an analysis
of Mid-South Grizzlies v. National Football League,8 6 which he
distinguished on two grounds.
First, unlike the Grizzlies, the plaintiffs here were not seeking to
join Major League Baseball through creation of a franchise but
were attempting to purchase an existing team. The import of this
distinction turns upon the second distinction, which is that also
unlike the Grizzlies, who identified the relevant product market
as major-league professional football generally, plaintiffs here have
identified the relevant product market as the market for existing
American League and National League baseball teams.
817
After analyzing the standing issue under the test established in
Associated Gen. Contractor, Inc., v. California State Council of
Carpenters,'88 Padova rejected Major League Baseball's contention that
plaintiffs lacked standing'8 9
Padova next turned to an analysis of Major League Baseball's
claim to be exempt from federal antitrust liability by considering the
decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals 19' and the
Supreme Court in Federal Baseball,'9' and the Supreme Court's
opinions in Toolson 92 and Flood. 93
Padova noted that each of the three cases involved the reserve
clause. Major League Baseball argued that the exemption extended to
the "business of baseball" generally, while plaintiffs asserted that the
exemption was limited to the reserve clause. Padova asserted that "[i]n
1972, however, the Court in Flood v. Kuhn stripped from Federal
Baseball and Toolson any precedential value those cases may have had
beyond the particular facts there involved, i.e., the reserve clause."
After an analysis of Charles 0. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn194 and recent
cases considering stare decisis, Padova "conclude(d) that the antitrust
exemption created by Federal Baseball is limited to baseball's reserve
system, and because'the parties agree that the reserve system is not
186. 420 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
187. 831 F. Supp. 430.
188. 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
189. 831 F. Supp. at 433.
190. 269 F. 681 (C.C.D.C. 1920).
191. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
192. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
193. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
194. 569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 876 (1978).
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at issue in this case, I reject Baseball's argument that it is exempt from
antitrust liability in this case."' 195
Padova then discussed the application of "rule stare decisis."' 196
Padova concluded that "the Federal Baseball exemption is one related
to a particular market-the market comprised of the exhibition of
baseball games-not a particular type of restraint (such as the reserve
clause) or a particular entity (such as Major League Baseball)."' 197
Judge Padova's intriguing analysis of the cases providing baseball
with its antitrust exemption and narrowing is scope to the reserve clause
could effect the need for Congressional activity. However, scholars,
Congressmen and judges argued for the premature death of the
exemption after Gardella'98 and prior to Flood. 199 Therefore, until the
United States Supreme Court supports Padova's position, it would be
best to consider the Court's admonition in both Toolson200 and Flood
to turn to Congress for resolution of baseball's antitrust status.
CURRENT LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES
The 103d Congress is considering three bills201 targeting baseball's
antitrust exemption. Senator Howard Metzenbaum introduced S. 500,
the "Professional Baseball Antitrust Reform Act of 1993," on March
4, 1993. Metzenbaum's bill would add a new section to the Clayton
Act 20 2 making organized baseball subject to the antitrust laws with the
exception of the provisions of the Sports Broadcasting Act of 1961.203
Representative Bilirakis introduced H.R. 108 and H.R. 1549, the
"Baseball Antitrust Restoration Amendment of 1993," in the House
of Representatives. H.R. 108 would subject baseball to antitrust
scrutiny, while H.R. 1549 will exclude baseball from the antitrust
exemption with respect to certain television contracts.
In December 1992, as the second session of the 102d Congress
was nearing its end, Senator Metzenbaum, chairman of the
Subcommittee on Antitrust, Monopolies and Business Rights of the
Senate Judiciary Committee, convened oversight hearings on baseball's
195. 831 F. Supp. at 438.
196. Id. at 438-439.
197. Id. at 439.
198. 172 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1949).
199. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
200. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
201. H.R. 108, H.R. 1549, S. 500, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. (1993).
202. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1988).
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-1295 (1988).
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antitrust status.20 4 In March 1993, Representative Jack Brooks,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law of
the House Judiciary Committee, held hearings on the same topic.
25
The major concerns of both chairmen and their subcommittees are the
changing nature of the commissioner's position and the resignation
or ouster of Fay Vincent and franchise relocation or expansion. The
comments of witnesses before the two subcommittees is a starting point
for analyzing the viability of the exemption and whether Congress,
after more than forty years of consideration, should finally alter more
than seventy years of jurisprudence with legislation to strip baseball
of its exemption.
CURRENT COMMENTARY ON THE ANTITRUST EXEMPTION
Andrew Zimbalist, Robert A. Woods Professor of Economics at
Smith College, presented his thoughts on the economics of baseball
and the antitrust exemption at the 1992 hearings. His remarks were
subsequently edited and expanded and published in an article in the
Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law.206 Zimbalist's presentation to
Metzenbaum's subcommittee 27 concentrated on five justifications
advanced by the ownership to support the exemption: players would
challenge the Reserve Clause, Major League Baseball is not profitable,
the exemption allows the commissioner to operate effectively, the
exemption prevents franchise relocations, the exemption prevents
frivolous litigation. In his article, 28 Zimbalist addressed a sixth
justification, that minor league baseball would be destroyed without
the exemption.
Gary Roberts, Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Tulane
University, also presented his thoughts on what he prefers to
characterize as baseball's antitrust exclusion before Senator
Metzenbaurn's Subcommittee2°9 and Mr. Brooks Subcommittee. 210 His
edited transcript of his 1992 comments was also presented as an article
204. Hearings on Baseball's Antitrust Immunity before the Subcommittee on Antitrust,
Monopolies and Business Rights of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992) [hereinafter 1992 Hearings].
205. 1993 Hearings, supra note 3.
206. Andrew Zimbalist, Baseball Economics and Antitrust Immunity, 4 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 287 (1994).
207. 1992 Hearings, supra note 204 at 281-332.
208. Zimbalist, supra note 206 at 303-306.
209. 1992 Hearings, supra note 204 at 333-357.
210. 1993 Hearings, supra note 3, at 75-96.
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in the Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law.21 Roberts points to four areas
in both his testimony and his article in which the exclusion offers
protection from antitrust litigation: rules affecting players, rules
affecting broadcasting, rules affecting the number, location and
ownership of franchises, and the relationship between the major and
minor leagues.
2 12
Allan Selig, Chairman of the Executive Council of Major League
Baseball and President and Chief Executive Officer of the Milwaukee
Brewers, presented comments before both subcommittees 2 3 and an
edited text for the Seton Hall Journal of Sport Law. 214 Selig's comments
presented his views on Major League Baseball's preference for franchise
stability and the resignation of Vincent and the future governance of
Major League Baseball.
NUMBER OF FRANCHISES
Of particular concern to the Congressional delegation from Florida
is expansion or relocation of franchises. 25 Florida legislators argue that
without the exemption either the Seattle Mariners or the San Francisco
Giants would have recently been purchased and moved to the Tampa
Bay area. However, a hallmark of all professional sports leagues is
the restriction of the number of franchises and sharp control over
relocation. Whether the complete elimination of baseball's antitrust
exemption would promote expansion is questionable in light of the
history of all major team sports. The lack of an antitrust exemption
has not been as significant a factor in expansion activities in football,
basketball, or hockey as market factors.
Professor Zimbalist, in comments before Senator Metzenbaum's
subcommittee, stated
The overriding economic characteristic of the industry is that there
is an artificial scarcity of franchises which is underwritten in part
by baseball's blanket exemption from the country's antitrust laws.
This scarcity of franchises and protected monopoly status, in turn,
can be held responsible for many of the industry's problems.2"6
211. Gary Roberts, On the Scope and Effect of Baseball's Antitrust Exclusion, 4 SETON
HALL J. SPORT L. 321 (1994).
212. Id. at 325-329; 1992 Hearings, supra note 204, at 339-344.
213. 1992 Hearings, supra note 204, at 82-120 and 1993 Hearings, supra note 3, at 48-
59.
214. Allan Selig, Major League Baseball and Its Antitrust Exemption, 4 SETON HALL J.
SPORT. L 277 (1994).
215. See note 3 supra.
216. 1992 Hearings, supra note 204, at 281.
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In considering the resulting uproar over the failure of the Giants
to move to St. Petersburg, Roberts points out that the real crux of
the problem is the lack of a sufficient number of franchises.2 1 7 As
Roberts notes, the lack of competition feeds the shortage by offering
no alternatives to cities capable of supporting major league franchises:
The shortage of franchises to meet reasonable demand reflects the
monopoly power of existing major league sports over the
nationwide market in which franchises in each sport are sold. If
a league faced meaningful market competition, it could not afford
to let attractive communities go without a team lest the competitor
take and entrench itself in those communities first.
218
Roberts further claims that the lack of significant revenue sharing
supports Major League Baseball's economic-based decision to severely
restrict expansion.
Professor Roger Noll of Stanford University, a long-standing
expert on issues of economics and sports, also testified at the 1992
Metzenbaum hearings. 2 9 A proponent of removal of the antitrust
exemption, 220 Noll stated that "removal of the antitrust exemption in
baseball is not likely, by itself, to solve the problem of scarcity in
franchises." ' 22' Noll points out four factors that limit expansion: the
franchise price effect, the home-town holdup effect, the broadcast
revenue-sharing effect, and the local competition effect. 222 After
discussing the inability of antitrust litigation to provide structural relief
unless the federal government was the plaintiff or due to the reluctance
to use antitrust to force expansion because of fear of retribution, Noll
concluded by observing
Thus, eliminating the baseball antitrust exemption leaves baseball
positioned like the other sports with respect to its control of
franchises. Whereas it will lose some control over the location of
its existing members, history in other sports suggests that it will
still not expand to the extent warranted by the economics of the
sport.
2 3
Zimbalist, pointing to Noll's second expansion-limiting factor,
attacked Selig's position on franchise stability by pointing out that Selig
217. Roberts, supra note 211 at 332-333.
218. Id. at 333.
219. 1992 Hearings, supra note 204 at 358-382.
220. Id. at 360.
221. Id. at 365.
222. Id. at 365-366.
223. Id. at 366.
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recently threatened to move the Brewers to Charlotte or Phoenix if
financial concessions were not made towards a new stadium in
Milwaukee.
224
Zimbalist suggests that "[t]here are enough economically-viable
cities to support a gradual expansion to forty teams by the year 2004.' '225
Zimbalist argues for legislation offering host cities a right of first
refusal, a system allowing for municipal ownership, legislation
mandating expansion, a federal sports commission, or a division of
existing teams into separate business entities.
2 6
Congressional removal of the antitrust exemption will not force
expansion nor necessarily solve the problems concerning the Florida
Congressional delegation. Only Congressional action specifically forcing
an expansion timetable, a difficult political position in which to gain
support, will accomplish this goal. Protection for cities with existing
franchises would best be resolved by considering legislation similar to
that introduced in the aftermath of the Raiders move from Oakland
to Los Angeles.
PLAYER RESTRAINTS
In great measure, the problems with the restrictive nature of the
reserve system which were the focus of Federal Baseball,227 Toolson,
22
1
and Flood229 have been significantly altered in Major League Baseball
by the Messersmith-McNally arbitration decision 230 and Kansas City
Royals v. Major League Baseball Players Assn23' which created a form
of free agency which subsequently became embodied in collective
bargaining agreements. The federal policy favoring labor law over
antitrust law embodied in the statutory and non-statutory labor
exemption in areas where the two policies come into direct conflict
has relegated the antitrust lever relatively useless in forcing changes
in systems restricting player mobility. Roberts supports this view by
stressing that the adroit use of negotiating strength by the Major League
Baseball Players Association has rendered the antitrust exclusion
"virtually non-existent. ' ' 23 2 Although allowing expiration of the
224. Zimbalist, s-upra note 206 at 303.
225. Zimbalist, supra note 206 at 316.
226. Id. at 316-317.
227. 259 U.S. 200 (1922).
228. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
229. 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
230. 66 Lab. Arb. 101 (1976).
231. 532 F.2d 615 (8th Cir. 1976).
232. Roberts, supra note 211 at 325-326.
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collective bargaining agreement and union decertification can bring the
leverage of antitrust liability into play as it did in McNeil v. National
Football League,233 the protracted nature of this exercise does not render
it particularly appealing.
Zimbalist, however, points to over four thousand minor league
ballplayers as well as major league players without six years of
experience as potential beneficiaries of the removal of baseball's
exemption.114 However, the rights won by NFL players in McNeil, as
in Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.235 and Mackey v. National Football
League236 earlier, were essentially compromised through approval of
collective bargaining agreements. The introduction of a salary cap in
the National Football League, similar to that in the National Basketball
Association and proposed for Major League Baseball as part of the
recently approved revenue sharing package, introduces a new type of
salary control and player mobility restriction. Furthermore, as Leon
Wood discovered when he attempted an antitrust assault on the
National Basketball Association's salary cap and rookie draft, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the labor exemption
effectively destroyed that avenue of relief.237 The Wood case somewhat
undercuts the argument that player restraints will necessarily be
positively effected because the labor exemption may well insulate certain
components of Major League Baseball's system from any antitrust
attack on its restraint of minor league players or players with limited
major league experience.
POWER OF THE COMMISSIONER
Senator Metzenbaum is particularly concerned about the departure
of Fay Vincent as Commissioner of Baseball. 238 His concern, as well
as that of many others, is predicated upon the ability of the
Commissioner to employ the "best interests" of baseball clause to
protect the integrity of the games and perhaps, the concerns of fans.
This power is not predicated upon the antitrust exemption, nor has
it been a bellwether in producing pro-competitive results. The power
to hire and fire the commissioner has always been the prerogative of
team owners, and it is arguable that the commissioner has often
233. 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
234. Zimbalist, supra note at 290.
235. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976).
236. 543 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1976).
237. Wood v. National Basketball Association, 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1984).
238. See note 2 supra.
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operated in the interest of any group other than the majority of owners.
Furthermore, one individual's determination of what actions are in the
best interest of the game do not necessarily insure those results. The
current restructuring may, indeed, strip the commissioner of his historic
powers. However, the simple removal of the antitrust exemption,
without any other measures to insure a mechanism which produces
pro-competitive results, will not produce the results Senator
Metzenbaum desires.
MINOR LEAGUE BASEBALL
Neil J. Sullivan in his book The Minors3 9 argues that the basic
structure of minor league baseball was forced upon them by Major
League Baseball which destroyed the independent minor league system
during the first-half century by ultimately forcing their farm system
and its underlying economic structure upon the minor leagues. The
recent resurgence of economically viable minor league teams brought
about tough negotiations when the Professional Baseball Agreement
between the minor leagues and Major League Baseball was restructured
in 1990.24
0
It is true that baseball's minor league system is substantially
different than the collegiate system which produces players for the
National Basketball Association or the National Football League. The
implications of antitrust law is different for baseball. However, to argue
that the loss of the exemption would destroy the minor leagues gives
too little credit to a new economic order in minor league cities. Although
the loss of the exemption might create a significant restructuring in
the financial relationship with Major League Baseball, two factors point
towards a continuation of the minor league system: the lack of major
league expansion and the need for a system to generate major league
talent. With the current financial constraints on universities engaged
in major sports within the structure of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association, it is unlikely that collegiate baseball will be elevated to
the level of basketball and football.
BROADCASTING RIGHTS
Certain aspects of baseball's broadcasting activities is protected
from antitrust attack by the Sports Broadcasting Act. 241 As Zimbalist
239. Neil J. Sullivan, THE MINORS (1990).
240. See ANDREW ZIMBALIST, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS: A PROBING LOOK INSIDE THE BIG
BUSINESS OF OUR NATIONAL PASTIME 105-121 (1992).
241. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1291-5 (1988).
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and Roberts point out, the Major League Baseball's cable package on
the Entertainment and Sports Programming Network (ESPN) probably
violates the Sports Broadcasting Act.242 A loss of baseball's exempt
status would subject the package deal to an antitrust challenge, but
Zimbalist argues that the net result would be to simply redistribute
the revenue from local to national sources. 243 This concern has been
furthered effected by the revenue sharing agreements reached by
ownership, subject to the negotiation of a new collective bargaining
agreement with the Major League Baseball Players Association.
CONCLUSION
Congressional discussion of baseball's antitrust exemption stretches
over forty years involving a significant number of legislative initiatives.
Although the exemption is a judicial aberration without justification,
the 103d Congress will probably be no more successful than its
predecessors in altering its long-standing existence. The three bills under
consideration are not specifically crafted to resolve the problems of
the changes in the commissioner's office or the lack of an expansion
franchise or the relocation of an existing franchise to the Tampa-St.
Petersburg area. Much of the history of Congressional concern over
baseball's antitrust status suggests that broad-based attempts to
completely remove the exemption will not produce a favorable vote.
Only legislation tailored to a specific problem, such as the Sports
Broadcasting Act, would offer a solution in these two areas.
The concern over the alteration of the commissioner's position
will probably not receive long-term Congressional interest. The "best
interests" of baseball clause will not create additional expansion
opportunities, bring about labor-management peace, forestall a work
stoppage, or generate pro-competitive results for fans. Furthermore,
the retirement of Senator Howard Metzenbaum will curtail some of
the current momentum for antitrust reform.
Lifting of the exemption alone will not force substantial expansion
of Major League Baseball. Territorial allocations of geographic markets
and limitations on the number of total franchises still provide baseball
owners with limited competition for the Major League Baseball fans'
live gate attendance. Undoubtedly the existence of the exemption has
aided Major League Baseball in preventing the creation of competing
baseball leagues. The only recent serious challenge to Major League
242. Zimbalist, supra note 206 at 311; Roberts, supra note 211 at 327.
243. Id.
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Baseball, the Continental League, was blocked by the 1960's expansion
of the American League and the National League into three of the
eight intended Continental League cities. 2"4 The National Football
League, the National Basketball Association, and the National Hockey
League, without the assistance of an antitrust exemption, have been
challenged by competing leagues in court as well on the gridiron, court,
and ice. All three leagues have been forced to merge with their most
effective competitor leagues, or they have beaten back the challenging
leagues during the past thirty years to leave only one major league with
a monopolistic hold on the current landscape of major team sports.
Furthermore, the recent discussion of additional expansion into Phoenix
and St. Petersburg may persuade Senator Graham and Representative
Bilirakis to accept a possible offer of a guaranteed franchise in exchange
for dropping the pursuit of the removal of the exemption through
Congressional action.245
Major League Baseball has enjoyed a tremendous ability to survive,
and, indeed, thrive, despite all attempts by ownership and players to
destroy it. Unless the current legislation is amended to offer a focused
solution to an identified problem, the 103d Congress will probably offer
no greater threat to baseball's storied seventy years of privileged
antitrust status than the past twenty-two Congresses.
244. ALEXANDER, supra note 6 at 246-247; JAMES QUIRK & RODNEY D. FORT, PAY DIRT:
THE BUSINESS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS 320 (1992); ZIMBALIST, supra note 240 at 16-17.
245. Hubert Mizell, Bypassed Bay Hopes Once Again, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 3,
1994, at IC; Hal Bodley, Baseball Forms New Expansion Committee, USA TODAY, Mar. 3,
1994, at IC.

